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1Contemporary theorization of the post-secular involves, and further invites, 
philosophical and historical reflection on the nature of the secular. Charles 
Taylor, in A Secular Age, has warned against what he terms “subtraction 
stories” of the emergence of modern secularism, narratives built around 
simplistic images of the rejection of, and liberation from, a Christian age 
of faith; these polemical confections need to be replaced, he argues, by 
accounts that register the complex processes by which secularism emerged 
out of the Christian, and how it bears the deep traces of that origin.1 Over 
seventy years before Taylor’s injunction, Marcuse can be seen to be acting 
within its spirit when he explored what he termed “the Christian bourgeois 
concept of freedom,”2 the formulation of which, in the tumultuous events 
of the Reformation, marks, he maintained, the beginnings of modern 
liberal secular society. In the subsequent forty years, as he refined and 
revised his anatomy of liberal capitalism, he produced significant, and at 
times highly provocative, analyses of liberal democracy in which one can 
glimpse his awareness of the ambiguous legacy of religion—on the one 
hand reinforcing its initial pivotal role, but on the other providing a source 
of contestation against the negative features of that structuring. Through-
out, his perception of the nature of this negativity is deeply colored by 
his experience of fascism in the 1930s; time and again he returns to the 
trauma of Weimar Germany, where, he maintains, liberal capitalism gave 
1. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, Harvard UP, 2007), 
pp. 22–28.
2. Herbert Marcuse, “A Study on Authority,” in Studies in Critical Philosophy, trans. 
Joris de Bres (London: New Left Books, 1972), p. 129.
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birth to fascism, and might readily do so again; this significantly marks his 
understanding of liberalism. 
The Reformation and the Ambiguities of Freedom
In the mid-1930s, when Marcuse was seeking to notate the intricate dance 
of freedom and authority in modern capitalism, his starting point was 
the work of an Augustinian monk, Martin Luther. This was his “Study 
on Authority,” a contribution to the Institute for Social Research’s Stud-
ies on Authority and the Family (1936), an exile work published in Paris 
with material provided by Jewish thinkers dispersed over two continents. 
For Marcuse the royal road to understanding the catastrophe that had 
precipitated their flight from Nazi Germany lay in comprehending the 
genesis of liberalism. He gave an essay he published in 1934 a title that 
belied his intention in the piece, for the actual claim in “The Struggle 
against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State” (1934) was that 
the capitalist basis of liberal ideology meant that a capitalist fascism had 
deep points of continuity with the liberalism its propaganda misrepre-
sented and caricatured; that in this sense “it is liberalism that ‘produces’ 
the total-authoritarian state out of itself, as its own consummation at a 
more advanced stage of development.”3 The “Study on Authority” had 
the task of showing how from the sixteenth century in Europe, beginning 
within religious thought, the robust contours of a worldview were crafted 
that would facilitate the protean needs of an omnivorous capitalism.
As Marcuse knew, the young Marx had seen Luther as the begetter of 
a new subjectivity in Reformation Germany—a theoretical revolution in 
“the brain of the monk.”4 In a conception that is clearly echoed in Marcuse’s 
analysis, Marx considers Luther to have engineered the internalization of 
authority, conceived as freedom, in German Protestantism, summed up in 
a passage Marcuse quotes in his own text: “Luther, we grant, overcame the 
bondage of piety by replacing it by the bondage of conviction. He shattered 
faith in authority because he restored the authority of faith. . . . He freed 
man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the inner man.”5 
3. Herbert Marcuse, “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of 
the State,” in negations, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 19.
4. Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Intro-
duction,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1975), 3:182.
5. Ibid.
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And in the economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx suggests the 
future trajectory of this new mentality, drawing on Engels’s remark that 
Adam Smith was the Luther of political economy, with private property 
being transformed in his conception from a thing external to individuals 
into their inner core.6 
Marcuse’s encounter with the economic and Philosophic Manu-
scripts, shortly after their publication for the first time in 1932, was a 
pivotal moment for his theoretical development. In a review of the Manu-
scripts of that same year, one crackling with admiration, the point he was 
most insistent to make was that we now knew that Marx had provided a 
philosophical basis for historical materialism, something that Marcuse had 
been previously searching for in the work of his supervisor at Freiburg, 
Heidegger. He also drew attention to Marx’s debt to Feuerbach, a figure 
to this day greatly underappreciated, and one who in Marxist circles has 
seldom had his due. It is, however, as a significant humanist materialist 
that Marcuse understands Feuerbach’s achievements—there is no men-
tion of the powerful analysis of religion that underlay Feuerbach’s project 
and which animated Marx’s development of the concepts of alienation 
and ideology. For this aspect of Feuerbach, the work of Marcuse’s older 
contemporary, Ernst Bloch, is more insightful.
When he came to treat Luther in “A Study on Authority” Marcuse was 
drawn to the explanatory power of dualism in anatomizing liberal capital-
ism. Again, an early Marx provenance is likely. Certainly in England at 
this time in the 1930s the maverick Scottish philosopher John Macmurray 
had alighted on the concept of dualism following his own study of the 
German edition of the economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and other 
texts of the young Marx, actively encouraged by his friend Karl Polanyi. 
In Macmurray’s case he seems to have been impressed by Marx’s analy-
sis in on the Jewish Question where he posits a dual life experienced by 
people in capitalism—a heavenly one in the realm of free citizenship, and 
an earthly one in the alienated conditions of civil society—though as a 
Christian (a highly unorthodox one) he was very conscious of the reli-
gious, Feuerbachian roots of this approach in Marx, and in this respect is 
closer to Bloch than Marcuse.7 For Marcuse the notion of a dual existence 
6. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” trans. Martin Mil-
ligan and Dirk J. Struik, in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, 3:290–91.
7. See Vincent Geoghegan, Socialism and religion: roads to Common Wealth (Lon-
don and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 22–23.
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provided a handle on the complex dialectic of freedom and unfreedom in 
liberal capitalism, for “the union of internal autonomy and external het-
eronomy, the disintegration of freedom in the direction of its opposite is 
the decisive characteristic of the concept of freedom which has dominated 
bourgeois theory since the Reformation.”8 
Marcuse roots secularism in the religious thought of the Reformation 
in the opening sentence of his discussion of Luther. Luther’s the Freedom 
of a Christian, he writes, “brought together for the first time the elements 
which constitute the specifically bourgeois concept of freedom and which 
became the ideological basis for the specifically bourgeois articulation of 
authority.”9 That there was something fundamentally religious about lib-
eral secular society had been argued by Marx in on the Jewish Question. 
Indeed, he maintained that the liberal secular state was more religious than 
the old religious state because it “perfected” the dualistic split in indi-
viduals between their real and imaginary lives: “they are religious because 
men treat the political life of the state, an area beyond their real individu-
ality, as if it were their true life.”10 For Marcuse, Luther’s stress on the 
inner freedom of the individual left the outer person disengaged from and 
dominated by the external world. More pernicious still was that the inner 
freedom needed external unfreedom to feel like freedom. He expresses 
this imperative in Luther’s words: “A Christian is free and independent 
in every respect, a bondservant to none. A Christian is a dutiful servant in 
every respect, owing a duty to everyone.”11 This, Marcuse argues, is “the 
dualistic doctrine of the two realms, with freedom entirely assigned to 
one, and unfreedom entirely assigned to the other.”12 Here is the nature of 
the real break with medieval Roman Catholicism—a rejection of praxis, a 
sundering of the link between reason and free activity in the world, a link 
implied in Aquinas’s notion of humans as rational animals.13
The reference to Aquinas raises the question of whether Marcuse 
thought in the “Study” that religious traditions could provide resources of 
resistance as well as resources of support for capitalism. In a small number 
of places in the section on the Reformation he does seem to countenance 
8. Marcuse, “A Study on Authority,” p. 51.
9. Ibid., p. 56.
10. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” trans. Clemens Dutt, in Marx and Engels, 
Collected Works, 3:159.
11. Marcuse, “A Study on Authority,” p. 56.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 72.
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this possibility. Thus in a discussion of scripture he notes that the Deca-
logue (ten commandments) provided a norm against which “officiating 
authorities could be ‘critically’ measured” and noted the incorporation of 
this idea in later Calvinist attacks on absolutism;14 and at a more utopian 
level, he spoke of the “radical transcendental Christianity of the New 
Testament.”15 He also noted that Luther’s insistence on the freedom of the 
person “encouraged an anti-authoritarian tendency” that drew on notions 
of “love, equality, and justice,” and “were a recurrent source of anxiety to 
the rising bourgeoisie owing to their revolutionary application in peasant 
revolts, Anabaptism, and other religious sects.”16 Also, like Ernst Bloch 
and Karl Mannheim, he was aware of the radical opponent of Luther, 
Thomas Münzer, and appreciatively quotes Münzer’s critique of Luther’s 
defense of authority and property. However this is all very thinly theo-
rized. Furthermore, and obviously not for the last time, he points to the 
absorptive power of capitalism—here in the person of Calvin. Calvin was 
responsible for “smoothing-out the contradictions appearing” in Lutheran 
ideas and for facilitating “the incorporation of these destructive tendencies 
into the bourgeois order.”17
Anglo-American Liberalism and the Nature of Tolerance
Marcuse’s discussion of Luther and Calvin provides the basis for his 
analysis of the secularization of the Christian bourgeois conception of 
freedom, first in Kant and then Hegel, the latter in turn providing the link, 
for Marcuse, to Marx’s definitive reading of the rise of liberal thinking. 
Marcuse in the Study does not discuss another liberal genealogy with deep 
religious roots—Anglo-American liberalism. The key theoretical and 
political issue in this tradition—the proper relationship between the public 
and the private—was massively shaped by the religious wars that erupted 
in the wake of the Reformation, culminating in the bloody stalemate of the 
Thirty Years War (1618–48). Toleration, initially a pragmatic necessity 
grimly conceded, was in the hands of Locke (with his conception of the 
nature of authentic religious belief) and the deist Jefferson elevated into 
one of the defining principles of Anglo-American liberalism. Marcuse’s 
14. Ibid., p. 69.
15. Ibid., p. 68.
16. Ibid., pp. 65, 66.
17. Ibid., p. 66.
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most controversial engagement with this tradition is to be found in his 
1965 essay “Repressive Tolerance.”
If the context for the “Study” had been the rise of European fascism, 
the context for “Repressive Tolerance” was Marcuse’s conviction that 
individual autonomy was being systematically undermined in the con-
sumerist societies of western capitalism, most notably the United States. 
Marcuse had produced his anatomy of such societies the previous year in 
one dimensional Man; the opening sentence of the first chapter expressed 
the seemingly paradoxical nature of his central claim: “A comfortable, 
smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial 
civilization, a token of technical progress.”18 “Democratic unfreedom” is 
clearly not the same as fascism, though it still evokes a failure of lib-
eralism—but of a different kind. While the “Study” was premised on 
a trajectory from liberalism to fascism, one dimensional Man had to 
account for a liberal trajectory that in the case of Britain and the United 
States had not led to this outcome. Marcuse attempts to lessen the gap 
between fascism and “democratic unfreedom” by calling the advanced 
western societies “totalitarian,” but notes himself that under this term one 
can distinguish “terroristic political coordination of society” from “non-
terroristic economic-technical coordination.”19 This context colors his 
account of western liberalism. He acknowledges its radical and critical 
past, albeit constrained by its link to private property, but argues that it has 
become absorbed and neutralized by the societies its revolutions created: 
“Freedom of thought, speech, and conscience were . . . essentially critical 
ideas. . . . Once institutionalized, these rights and liberties shared the fate of 
the society of which they had become an integral part. The achievement 
cancels the premises.”20 
The neutralization effect of one-dimensional society extends to reli-
gion. Religiosity and spirituality flourishes in these conditions: “there is a 
great deal of ‘Worship together this week,’ ‘Why not try God?,’ Zen,”21 but 
its function has changed. In effect acknowledging the critical role that reli-
gion has played historically, he argues that “such modes of transcendence 
are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative.”22 
18. Herbert Marcuse, one dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1972), p. 16.
19. Ibid., p. 17.
20. Ibid., p. 16 (Marcuse’s emphasis).
21. Ibid., p. 25.
22. Ibid.
 MArCuSe And “the ChriStiAn BourGeoiS ConCePt oF FreedoM”  7
They have become part of the furniture of a secular society—“the cer-
emonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation . . . quickly 
digested by the status quo.”23 Again, one recalls Marx’s claim that the 
modern secular state is the most Christian in that it basks in its supposed 
universality and “relegates religion to a place among the other elements of 
civil society.”24 
Turning to “Repressive Tolerance,”25 we have an essay on the pro-
tean nature of the concept of tolerance within liberal discourse—both 
historically and within contemporary usage; a veritable cubist depiction 
of distinct facets and aspects. The historical framework is painted in broad 
brushstrokes and is couched in the language of the Marxist theory of 
bourgeois revolutions; the political focus is on the experience of Anglo-
American liberalism. In its radical historical phase liberalism is deemed 
to have practiced “partisan” tolerance involving active intolerance toward 
the supporters of the old order. Even in England and the United States, 
he argues, with their “firmly established” liberal societies, while oppo-
nents were allowed to speak and assemble freely they were not allowed 
to “make the transition from word to deed, from speech to action.”26 This 
mode of tolerance is contrasted with the “repressive” tolerance of modern 
liberal democracy, made up of a “passive” tolerance of “entrenched and 
established attitudes” and an “active” non-partisan stance vis-à-vis Right 
and Left, reactionary and progressive, which, in conditions of inequality, is 
thereby actively partisan toward the forces of the status quo.27 Repressive 
tolerance is so perniciously potent for Marcuse because the autonomous 
individual of classical liberal theory is an endangered species in modern 
liberal democracy. To develop this argument Marcuse employs the ser-
vices of John Stuart Mill, who is allowed to present a liberal autocritique. 
Mill’s recoil from the radical democratic hedonism of Bentham, his inser-
tion of a qualitative criterion in assessing pleasure, his fear of the tyranny 
of the majority, provided a liberal rationalist critique of modern liberal 
23. Ibid.
24. Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” p. 156.
25. For a useful account of the reception of “Repressive Tolerance,” see Rodney 
Fopp, “Herbert Marcuse’s ‘Repressive Tolerance’ and his Critics,” Borderlands: An 
e-Journal 6:1 (2007).
26. Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive tolerance,” in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington 
Moore Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure tolerance (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1969), pp. 99, 100.
27. Ibid., p. 99.
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democratic society that chimed well with Marcuse’s one dimensionality 
thesis.28 He quotes Mill’s assertion that “liberty, as a principle, has no 
application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have 
become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion,”29 and he 
himself asserts that “there is a sense in which truth is the end of liberty, and 
liberty must be defined and confined by truth.”30
Marcuse’s account of partisan tolerance in practice is complicated 
because he oscillates between describing a hypothetical context in which 
this tolerance is central policy, and assessing the terrain of struggle as it 
exists in actual time. Partisan tolerance for Marcuse, as we have seen, 
necessarily involved intolerance. Intolerance was remarkably effective. 
Mill had recognized this when he noted that “the dictum that truth always 
triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men 
repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all 
experience refutes”;31 and Marcuse concurs with Mill’s skeptical judgment 
about the “inherent power” of truth.32 Yet he also recognized with Mill that 
this effectiveness had frequently been used in the service of tyranny and 
repression. Where, therefore, given the demands of political realism, were 
the boundaries to intolerance to be drawn? In terms of the criteria for what 
should not be tolerated Marcuse suggests an assessment of content and 
threat, and in terms of the scope of intolerance this could apply to words 
and actions. When specifying specific possible examples, the net is thrown 
wide, for this could “include the withdrawal of toleration of speech and 
assembly from groups and movements which promote aggressive policies, 
armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and reli-
gion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, 
medical care, etc.”33 As to who is to decide these matters, the hegemony 
of one-dimensionality means that initially it will be the enterprise of ratio-
nal minorities, which, given the entrenched political and social power of 
vested interests, means that extra-legal actions, including violence, could 
be legitimate. 
28. This is not a claim about Mill’s actual purposes but simply about his function in 
Marcuse’s argument.
29. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” p. 100.
30. Ibid.
31. John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John Stuart Mill on Liberty and other essays, 
ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), p. 33.
32. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” p. 104.
33. Ibid., p. 114.
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In the presentation of these arguments a curious semantic reversal 
occurs. Convinced as he was of the dark underbelly of contemporary lib-
eral tolerance, Marcuse uses a range of devices to deflate what he takes to 
be the pretensions of this discourse: concepts are given negative qualifiers, 
as in “spurious neutrality,”34 or are undermined by the addition of nega-
tive content (“toleration of sense and nonsense”),35 or are linked to their 
opposite (“freedom . . . becomes an instrument for absolving servitude”).36 
Alongside this however is a strangely positive embrace of a number of 
anti-liberal concepts. The use of “intolerance” we have already seen. But 
there is also “censorship” and “precensorship,” as when Marcuse says of 
the prohibiting of reactionary words and deeds, “to be sure, this is cen-
sorship, even precensorship, but openly directed against the more or less 
hidden censorship that permeates the free media,”37 and “discrimination” 
as in “discriminatory tolerance.”38 There is almost a sense of relish in the 
breaking of liberalism’s taboos.
When quizzed later about “Repressive Tolerance,” Marcuse acknowl-
edged that he was “intentionally provocative” in the essay, and the reason 
he gives for this attitude brings us back to the context of the Study, for he 
attributes his anger not to any specific U.S. factor but rather to the “new 
toleration of Nazi and proto-Nazi movements” by the West German state 
in the 1960s, and that this had looped him back to “what had happened 
in the Weimar Republic with the toleration of the Nazi movement and 
other militant movements on the right.”39 And certainly in “Repressive 
Tolerance” the failure of Weimar liberal democracy to prevent the rise of 
the Nazis is deemed to point out an important, and to Marcuse a deeply 
personal and heartfelt, political lesson: “if democratic tolerance had been 
withdrawn when the future leaders started their campaign, mankind would 
have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz and a World War.”40 From the 
perspective of this piece of counterfactual speculation, Weimar failed to 
act as a liberal state and was consequently superseded as a liberal state. 
The issue of state-capture thus haunts his reflections on toleration—the 
34. Ibid., p. 127.
35. Ibid., p. 108.
36. Ibid., p. 98.
37. Ibid., p. 125.
38. Ibid., p. 120.
39. Myriam Miedzian Malinovich, “Herbert Marcuse in 1978: An Interview,” Social 
research 48, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 381.
40. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” p. 123.
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phenomenon of hostile groups using the freedoms of liberal democracy 
to capture the state and use it as an instrument to extirpate liberty. Two of 
the most astute political analysts of early modern Europe, Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, had theorized the relationship between weak states and politi-
cal tyranny (where weakness is understood as the lack of an informed 
resolve to protect the fundamental strengths of the society against oppo-
nents) and had anticipated the secular form an effective state theory would 
require. In Machiavelli’s case—in the context of a broken and subjugated 
Italy—recognition that states are not churches, that overlapping but dis-
tinct moralities are necessary in the public and private spheres, informs his 
account of the flinty duty of the good state. Anything else indicates state 
weakness, and leads to regime change and the misery of the people. For 
Hobbes, surveying the carnage of decades of religious wars in Europe, the 
threat to liberty came from religious fanatics who wished to gain control 
of states to enforce their dogmas. His strong state, his Leviathan, was thus 
necessitated by the need to keep religious groups firmly in their place. 
Likewise for Marcuse the Nazis provided the “most realistic model”41 of 
how a liberal state had been captured, and the attendant stark choices that 
needed to be faced. Certainly the classic liberal words/action distinction—
as in Jefferson’s “it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are 
twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg”42—
has in significant ways been collapsed in liberal democratic theory and 
practice since the days of “Repressive Tolerance” in the form of legislation 
combating racist and homophobic speech. Furthermore, the terror threat 
post-9/11 has forced some tough questions to be asked about the extent of 
civil liberties.
“Repressive Tolerance” has very little to say about the role of religion 
in a liberal secular society. Two things are of note. First, there is a difference 
with Mill on the nature of the religious roots of liberalism. In on Liberty 
Mill, to substantiate his claim about the power of persecution, argues that 
“the Reformation broke out at least twenty times before Luther, and was 
put down,” and he cites heretics such as Fra Dolcino and Savonarola as 
examples.43 Marcuse clearly sees this as Mill presenting the liberal grand 
41. Malinovich, “Herbert Marcuse in 1978,” p. 381.
42. Thomas Jefferson, Political Writings, ed. Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 394.
43. Mill, “On Liberty,” p. 33.
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narrative of the rise of freedom, with the Reformation as a nodal point; for 
Mill “the criterion of progress in freedom . . . is the Reformation.”44 This, 
for Marcuse, is an undialectical, unhistorical account of the emergence 
of liberalism that ignores dark contradictions—“Savonarola too would 
have burned Fra Dolcino”—and lazily equates heresy with truth (“Her-
esy by itself . . . is no token of truth”).45 Second, there is a brief passing 
reference to the issue of religious tolerance where Marcuse is attempt-
ing to designate those activities that need “indiscriminate tolerance.” He 
establishes two categories of activity in what appears to be a hierarchy: 
“indiscriminate tolerance is justified in harmless debates, in conversation, 
in academic discussion; it is indispensable in the scientific enterprise, in 
private religion.”46 If “justified” is a less pressing claim than “indispens-
able,” then religion, so long as it meets the secular criterion of “private,” is 
accorded here a relatively exalted status. If, however, there is no inferred 
substantive difference underpinning this linguistic usage, this still places 
religion in a ring-fenced realm of tolerance.
Religion, Science, and the Enlightenment
The bracketing together of religion and science as needing maximum tol-
erance raises the question of how Marcuse understood the contemporary 
relationship between these two practices. He rejects neo-Enlightenment 
narratives where scientific rationalism is the cutting edge of human prog-
ress, and the “decline” of religion is a major measure of the success of 
its mission. In eros and Civilization (1955) he takes Freud to task for 
espousing such a narrative in the Future of an illusion, where the “illu-
sion” in question is religion. According to Marcuse, Freud thought “that 
the disappearance of this illusion would greatly accelerate the material and 
intellectual progress of mankind, and he praised science and scientific rea-
son as the great liberating antagonists of religion.”47 But this is to ignore 
the fact that in the contemporary world the “function of science and of 
religion has changed—as has their interrelation.”48
To understand the direction of this analysis we need to first look at 
Marcuse’s critical appropriation of Freud’s exploration of the historical 
44. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” p. 105.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 102.
47. Herbert Marcuse, eros and Civilisation (London: Abacus, 1972), p. 64.
48. Ibid.
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psychology of religion, for although he rejects Freud’s scientistic Enlighten-
ment optimism he believes that Freud’s anthropological and psychological 
speculations in (above all) Moses and Monotheism provide real insight 
into the historical dialectic of domination and liberation. He accepts that 
Freud’s positing of an archaic primal horde ruled by a despotic father lacks 
anthropological evidence, but he argues that it has “symbolic value.” In 
Freud’s conjectural “history,” rebellious sons overthrow the father and his 
monopoly on women (sexual pleasure) only fearfully to renounce the lib-
eration they have achieved by patricide and to establish their own order of 
domination. There is a double guilt here—guilt in killing the father (with 
its threat of social collapse) and guilt in betraying their goal of overthrow-
ing domination. The historical recurrence of this phenomenon is deemed 
to be captured in Freud’s notion of the “return of the repressed.” Taking his 
cue from Freud’s exploration of this “return” in Judaism, Marcuse attempts 
to do the same for Christianity. Jesus the earthly Messiah undergoes “tran-
substantiation” and “deification” by his followers; these Christians are, 
to use Freud’s phrase, “badly christened” in that “they accept and obey 
the liberating gospel only in a highly sublimated form—which leaves the 
reality unfree as it was before.”49 This betrayal was resisted by various 
heretical groups who sought “to rescue the unsublimated content and the 
unsublimated objective,” who were repressed with a bloody and sadistic 
fury by the Church, where “the executioners and their bands fought the 
specter of a liberation which they desired but which they were compelled 
to reject.”50
In eros and Civilization this characterization of Christianity is slotted 
into the metanarrative that was to inform one dimensional Man—“the 
total mobilization of man and nature.”51 Science has lost its rational cutting 
edge, its capacity to negate bad facticity, and has instead become thor-
oughly positivist, anchoring people in a world of alienation. As such it is 
“one of the most destructive instruments” in the service of human oppres-
sion, “destructive of that freedom from fear which it once promised.”52 
The glory days of science battering down the irrational resistances of 
religion are over. But then religion itself “has equally effectively dis-
carded its explosive elements.”53 Thus, their social functions have become 
49. Ibid., p. 63.
50. Ibid., pp. 63–64.
51. Ibid., p. 64.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
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“complementary,” dispelling hope and tethering humans to the “reality” of 
capitalism. However, in a significant qualification of this claim Marcuse 
in effect reverses the central theme of the neo-Enlightenment narrative by 
suggesting that insofar as religion has retained its gold-bearing seam of 
Jesus the earthly Messiah—“the overthrow of the Law (which is domina-
tion) by Agape (which is Eros)”54—then it is religion and not science that 
is a vehicle for the repressed truths of the human project: “where religion 
still preserves the uncompromised aspirations for peace and happiness, 
its ‘illusions’ still have a higher truth value than science which works for 
their elimination.”55 Religion’s light would thus oppose science’s dark 
superstition.
Religion, Freedom, and the New Left
In the late 1960s when the increased tempo of radical political action sug-
gested to Marcuse that events were moving “beyond One-Dimensional 
Man,”56 his role as a radical public intellectual meant that his theorizing 
was often expressed in media and spaces where rigor had to be accom-
panied by accessibility and political savvy. In a lecture delivered in a 
Connecticut synagogue in 1969, he used Marx’s critique of religion to 
structure his reflections on the Janus-faced aspects of contemporary reli-
gion. Marx’s analysis he insisted should rightly be the starting point for 
such reflections, for “even today . . . no evaluation of the role of religion in 
changing society can be made without meeting the criticism of religion by 
Marx.”57 Essentially Marcuse uses Marx’s critical engagement with Feuer-
bach’s analysis of Christianity (though Feuerbach is not mentioned) as 
expressed in the classic “opium of the people” section of the “Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction.” Marcuse’s 
emphasis is on the double-edged nature of monotheistic religion; it is not 
54. Ibid., p. 63.
55. Ibid., p. 65.
56. Douglas Kellner, in volume 2 of the Collected Papers of herbert Marcuse, 
shows that what became the optimistic An essay on Liberation (1969) was originally to be 
entitled Beyond one-dimensional Man (Herbert Marcuse, towards A Critical theory of 
Society, vol. 2 of Collected Papers of herbert Marcuse, ed. Douglas Kellner [London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001], p. 108). Kellner is owed a serious debt of gratitude for assem-
bling the volumes of the Collected Papers; they significantly add to the range of available 
Marcuse texts and include Kellner’s valuable contextual and introductory material.
57. Herbert Marcuse, “The Role of Religion in a Changing Society,” in Philosophy, 
Psychoanalysis and emancipation, vol. 5 of Collected Papers of herbert Marcuse, ed. 
Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 183.
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a simple imposture—“the willful creation of some men or even one man,” 
but is the expression of the experience of oppression, which has then been 
“organized and exploited by powerful groups.”58 Thus the phrase “opium 
of the people” has to be read in conjunction with Marx’s conviction that 
religion has been the heart of a heartless world.
This type of reading and the direction he wished to take it requires 
some deft exegesis on Marcuse’s part, for he undoubtedly knew that the 
outcome of Marx’s sustained critique of religion in 1843–44 was an attitude 
of malign neglect toward the phenomenon of religion, with Christianity 
deemed to be a mere vestigial epiphenomenon of more basic processes. 
Thus in his summing up of Marx’s critique he stresses a link between 
continuing oppression and the utility of religion. The notion of religion as 
the heart of a heartless world, he says,
emphasizes the need for religion as long as mental and physical oppres-
sion prevail and no effective forces striving for change of these conditions 
are operating. In other words, religion can and should disappear from 
earth . . . only by the collective effort to establish justice, equality, and 
happiness here on earth. And in this way the abolition of religion would 
presuppose the coming about of a free and just society.59
This suggests a continuing theoretical and political space for a radical 
reworking of the traditions of religion in the process of collective activ-
ity. In the case of Marx, however, his few and far between references to 
religion after 1844 seek to castigate Christianity for its social values, relate 
it to declining social forces, and document his belief that the proletariat is 
becoming fundamentally anti-religious—the communist goal of freedom 
from religion should be operative in the struggle itself.60
Marcuse pursues the notion of religion’s two functions to explore, 
elucidate, and contextualize the revolutionary dimension in religion; a uto-
pian role: religion as “articulating and sustaining the vision of a fulfillment 
of human needs and aspirations for all men”; and a critical role: “a critical, 
sometimes even radical no to prevailing inequality, injustice, and misery, 
and in this respect a progressive force.”61 The audience is asked to relate to 
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., pp. 183–84 (Marcuse’s emphasis).
60. See Vincent Geoghegan, “Religion and Communism: Feuerbach, Marx and 
Bloch,” the european Legacy 9, no. 5 (2004): 590.
61. Marcuse, “The Role of Religion in a Changing Society,” p. 184 (Marcuse’s 
emphasis).
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the subversive elements in Judaism by reflecting on a passage from Amos 
that had been quoted earlier in the gathering. The passage is not identified, 
but there is much in Amos about social injustice: of those that “sold the 
righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes” (2:6) and who “afflict 
the just . . . take a bribe . . . and turn aside the poor in the gate (5:11); and 
there is the vision of a better earthly time: “Behold, the days come, saith 
the LORD, that the plowman shall overtake the reaper, and the treader of 
grapes him that soweth seed; and the mountains shall drop sweet wine, 
and all the hills shall melt” (9:13). Whatever the precise passage Marcuse 
describes, it as “one of the best instances for this very concrete, critical, 
radical, even revolutionary element in religion.”62 And while reiterating 
his long held view that the radical element had become persecuted heresy 
in the established church, he added “that the canonization of the prophets 
is one of the rare exceptions in this development.”63 
He deploys the concept of “secularization” in an intriguing manner, 
referring to “a new secularization of religion, not however in the tradi-
tional sense”64 that would appear to be a call to move away from the old 
secular privatization of religion toward a politicization of religion: “The 
progressive critical elements of religion . . . must be translated into real-
ity . . . and not merely as pious profession of faith on holidays, not merely 
as a ritual or custom or tradition. In other words . . . religion must become, 
if it makes any effort to take its own truth seriously . . . the expression of 
a political attitude and show political concern.”65 This is the only way 
an affirmative answer can be given to the question—a reformulation of 
Adorno’s famous remark about the possibility of poetry post-Holocaust—
that he poses to his audience: “Is religion still possible after Auschwitz?”66 
And he invests great hope in the rebellious potential of youth. He talks of 
a “radical transformation of the Oedipus complex,” where it is the fathers 
who are guilty, not the sons, which “weakens the sense of guilt which 
is so essential to religion” (in its negative function).67 As with authentic 
religion in the past, there is a strong moral core in the protest of youth—
“an anti-puritanism, a libertarian morality, but a morality nevertheless.”68 
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 186.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 187.
67. Ibid., p. 186.
68. Ibid., p. 187. 
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In another lecture he gave in this period, he drew attention to the political 
contribution made by radical clerics. While Marxist theory was “irrecon-
cilable” with the “dogma” and institutional forms of Christianity, it found 
an “ally in those tendencies, groups, and individuals committed to the 
part of Christian teaching that stands uncompromisingly against inhuman, 
exploitative power,” religious tendencies to be found in priests and minis-
ters who have fought oppression and (an interesting formulation) “fascism 
in all its forms.”69
By the early 1970s the pessimistic tone that had been so prevalent in 
one dimensional Man was apparent once more. When asked in a 1973 
interview if the Paris events of 1968 had shown one dimensional Man 
to have been over-pessimistic, he replied: “It seems to me that unfortu-
nately what I said in my book has been corroborated. Unfortunately!”70 
The dark clouds appear in the titles of his work in this period, as in “The 
Movement in a New Era of Repression” and “The Left under the Coun-
terrevolution,” which signal not a simple return to the terrain of one 
dimensional Man but rather convey a sense of a new and deeply threaten-
ing stage of struggle.71 More specifically they contain his last significant 
reflections on the nature of liberal democracy and its purported modern 
tendency toward fascism. His focus is primarily the United States, which 
he declares “is not a fascist regime by any means,” but, he adds, the ques-
tion must be asked as to “whether the present phase of the (preventive) 
counterrevolution (its democratic-constitutional phase) does not prepare 
the soil for a subsequent fascist phase.”72 The sentiments are more candid 
(and angrier) in a fascinating unpublished manuscript of this time with its 
ambiguous descriptive/prescriptive title “The Historical Fate of Bourgeois 
Democracy.”73
69. Herbert Marcuse, “Marxism and the New Humanity: An Unfinished Revolution,” 
in Marxism and radical religion: essays toward a revolutionary humanism, ed. J. C. 
Raines and T. Dean (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1970), p. 10.
70. Herbert Marcuse, “Interview with Marcel Rioux,” Forces 22 (1973): 270.
71. Herbert Marcuse, “The Movement in a New Era of Repression: An Assessment,” 
Berkeley Journal of Sociology 16 (1971–72): 1–14; Herbert Marcuse, “The Left under 
the Counterrevolution,” in Counterrevolution and revolt (London: Allen Lanes, 1972), 
pp. 1–57.
72. Marcuse, “The Left under the Counterrevolution,” p. 24.
73. Herbert Marcuse, “The Historical Fate of Bourgeois Democracy,” in towards 
a Critical theory of Society, pp. 165–86. Kellner provides a valuable contextual note on 
p. 164.
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Richard Nixon’s presidential re-election in 1972 is invested with, from 
today’s perspective, a huge political, symbolic, and indeed historic signifi-
cance; it “demonstrated” how historically bourgeois democracy had been 
transformed from a “liberal-progressive” into a “reactionary-conservative 
society” and indicated that there were only two possible political alterna-
tives, “neo-fascism on a global scale, or transition to socialism,” with the 
former “the most likely one.”74 The possibility of a huge excluded middle 
is not seriously entertained. In sociopolitical terms Marcuse maintains that 
modern liberal democracies have expanded their historical hegemonies, 
enabling them safely to abandon that which once made them revolutionary; 
it thus gives “itself an enlarged popular base which supports the liquida-
tion of the remnants of the liberal period.”75 To give this analysis legs he 
posits a sadomasochistic instinctual identification of this enlarged social 
base with the political leader. His recommended sources for the details of 
this process all have roots in the attempts to understand fascist authori-
tarianism of the Weimar Germany generation: Fromm’s contribution to 
the Studies on Authority and the Family and his escape from Freedom, 
Reich’s work on the mass psychology of fascism, and Adorno et al.’s the 
Authoritarian Personality. The net effect of this political/psychological 
process is that liberal democracy engineers its own destruction: 
Rousseau is stood on his head; the General Will is incorporated in the 
government, rather the executive branch of the government. . . . [T]he 
underlying population at large becomes the subject-object of politics, 
of democracy: the people, “free” in the sense and within the limits of 
capitalism, and in this freedom, reproducing its servitude.76
Marcuse does acknowledge that liberal democracy provides more oppor-
tunities for political struggle than would be available in a neo-fascist 
regime, but it is a grudging acknowledgement. The New Left is “faced 
with the task of defending this democracy,” but it is the defense of a 
“lesser evil: lesser than suicide and suppression.”77 In theoretical terms 
this is to distinguish between capitalism’s political and economic forms, 
where, due to different social temporalities in contemporary capitalism, 
74. Ibid., p. 165.
75. Ibid., p. 167.
76. Ibid. (Marcuse’s emphasis).
77. Ibid., p. 177.
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“the bourgeois-democratic form ‘lags behind’ the monopoly and state 
capitalist structure, and thus preserves liberal institutions germane to a 
previous historical stage.”78 In strategic terms this is “to use bourgeois 
democracy for reducing its popular base.”79 Religion enters this analysis 
only in its negative ideological form. Christianity is indicted as a death 
cult that has copper-fastened oppression over the centuries and which has 
played a vital role in perpetuating the deceptions of liberal democracy: 
“Ever since the crucified God (Nietzsche has recognized the horror of this 
symbol), the worship of death . . . had held sway over civilization. . . . This 
ideology has been institutionalized in churches and schools . . . it permeates 
bourgeois democracy, it helps, again, and again, to prevent and ‘contain’ 
revolution.”80
Conclusion
Marcuse sought to express what he took to be the paradoxical nature of 
liberal democratic capitalism; a conception first developed in the early 
Marx. This was the view that the most intrusive social formation in human 
history presented itself as the least—a coup de théâtre that required the 
energy of the entire planet, and when the illusion was in danger the full 
brutality behind the performance was unleashed in all its naked horror. 
This meant an ideological struggle over the use and misuse of the term 
freedom, where the opponents held the high ground, and a critique of one 
conception of freedom could be construed as an attack on the concept 
itself. The analytical task, itself political, was to reveal the historical 
nature of this phenomenon, whose ideological roots Marcuse identified 
in the Protestant reformulation of the concept of freedom. In the 1969 
synagogue lecture discussed earlier, Marcuse returned to the theme of his 
1930s “Study”:
religion . . . introjects, internalizes repression. . . . The most obvious in-
stance of this . . . we find in Luther’s . . . concept of Christian liberty, 
according to which man is perfectly free even in chains, even in prison, 
because his freedom is an inner freedom, and an inner freedom 
only—freedom of conscience, freedom of thought—which is perfectly 
compatible with the most oppressive existential condition.81
78. Ibid., p. 178.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p. 173.
81. Marcuse, “The Role of Religion in a Changing Society,” p. 184.
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Religion was the discourse in which this new conception of freedom was 
framed and broadcast, and yet religious discourse contained other elements 
that spoke of genuine untrammeled freedom, speaking truth to power. 
Convinced as he was of the structurally determined weaknesses of 
liberal constitutionalism—etched into his soul by the Nazi capture of the 
Weimar state—he always found it difficult to celebrate (to use Bloch’s 
phrase) the “cultural surplus”82 of political liberalism. He was prepared to 
defend liberal democracy against the forces of reaction in the 1970s, but this 
was couched in the downbeat language of a “lesser evil.” There is indeed 
a plausible counterargument to his analysis of the relationship between 
liberalism and fascism that casts the former in a much more positive light, 
namely, that it was the relative weakness of liberalism in Germany and the 
concomitant strength of socialism and communism that attracted vested 
interests to fascism; in Britain, by contrast, a strong liberalism, which 
helped keep the main party of the Left a reformist “Labour” and not a 
radical “Socialist” party (“Under British conditions, a Socialist Party is the 
last, not the first, form of the Socialist movement in politics”83), meant that 
fascism was rendered an unattractive and unnecessary option;84 “social-
ism” was eventually to reach Germany on the tanks of the successors of 
another nineteenth-century great power that had a minimal liberal tradi-
tion—Russia. Certainly in today’s ideological climate, where, nationally 
and internationally, liberal secularism has come under increasing attack, 
a strong defense of the heritage of liberalism as part of a post-secularist 
critique of hyper-secularism is a political necessity, socialists included.
82. The notion that certain cultural forms generate a “surplus” that endures beyond 
the period of its genesis. This surplus consists of intimations of a fuller existence that are 
“not-yet.” See Vincent Geoghegan, ernst Bloch (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 48–49, 54–55.
83. Ramsay MacDonald, who was to become the first British Labour Prime Minister, 
writing in 1911. Quoted in Bernard Crick, Socialism (Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1987), 
p. 70. Mind you, MacDonald’s subsequent entry into a conservative-dominated “national 
government,” which split the Labour Party, could be seen as bolstering Marcuse’s case 
against liberal-democratic parliamentarianism.
84. See, for example, Robert Wuthnow, Communities of discourse: ideology and 
Social Structure in the reformation, the enlightenment, and european Socialism (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989), pp. 377–445.
